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1. INTRODUCTION
For the last decade there has been a growing interest in the interplay between
mathematical practice and argumentation. The study of each of these areas
promises to shed light on the other, as I and several other authors from a variety of
disciplines have argued. I am particularly grateful to Begoña Carrascal for her
careful critique of some central assumptions of this programme, as such challenges
are vital for its long-term success. In this commentary, I wish to respond to two of
her main points in a similar spirit. She writes: “From a review of many of the papers
[of the programme] … we can extract two main ideas. First, Johnson’s influential
definition placed a burden on many of their authors to justify the claim that
mathematical products are argumentative. Second, there is a manifest tension in
these works between the examples of mathematical products considered as
arguments and the process that leads to them” (Carrascal, 2013, p. 6). I will address
each of these ideas in turn.
2. THE CLAIM THAT MATHEMATICAL PRODUCTS ARE ARGUMENTATIVE
Carrascal correctly observes that many authors of works on mathematical
argumentation have interpreted finished proofs as arguments. She holds that this is
a mistake, or at least unnecessary; since the proving process is argumentative, the
product need not be: “there is no need to appeal to special cases to defend the
assertion that, in mathematical practice, there is a place for argumentation. We only
have to distinguish between mathematical products and mathematical practice”
(Carrascal, 2013, p. 6). It is on this point that I wish to challenge her. I agree that we
do not need to appeal to special cases—because ordinary, rigorous proofs are
arguments. The proving process is also argumentative, although we should expect
different sorts of argument in these two different contexts.
A preliminary point is that we should absolve Ralph Johnson of any
responsibility for the choice supporters of the programme have made to focus on
showing that proofs are arguments. Although both Ian Dove and I have published
rebuttals of Johnson’s view that proofs are not arguments (Dove, 2007; Aberdein,
2011), both of us had already defended the contrary view without reference to
Johnson (Dove, 2003; Aberdein, 2005). And other authors Carrascal discusses make
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-6.
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no reference to Johnson in any of the works she cites (for example Alcolea Banegas,
1998).
Much more importantly, our identification of proofs as arguments is firmly
grounded in mathematical practice: mathematicians themselves frequently speak of
proofs as arguments, and do not perceive any tension with the rigour of proofs in so
doing. For example, “A proof is a rhetorical device for convincing another
mathematician that a given statement (the theorem) is true. Thus a proof can take
many different forms. The most traditional form of mathematical proof is that it is a
tightly knit sequence of statements linked together by strict rules of logic” (Krantz,
2011, pp. 11 f.). Other authors go further, and challenge whether this alleged
tradition really is a tradition. For example, Alan Bundy observes that “Prior to the
invention of formal logic, a proof was any convincing argument. Indeed, it still is.
Presenting proofs in Hilbertian1 style has never taken off within the mathematical
community. Instead, mathematicians write rigorous proofs, i.e. proofs in whose
soundness the mathematical community has confidence, but which are not
Hilbertian” (Bundy et al., 2005, p. 2377). Bundy observes that Hilbertian proofs may
be easily, even mechanically, checked for errors and yet mistakes in rigorous proofs
often go unobserved for years. Thus, he concludes, rigorous proofs are not
Hilbertian (Bundy et al., 2005, p. 2378).
Many different terminologies have been employed for Bundy’s
rigorous/Hilbertian distinction (for a partial list, see Reid & Knipping, 2010, p. 26).
For example, Keith Devlin characterizes the distinction as follows: “The right wing
(‘right-or-wrong’, ‘rule-of-law’) definition is that a proof is a logically correct
argument that establishes the truth of a given statement. The left wing answer
(fuzzy, democratic, and human centered) is that a proof is an argument that
convinces a typical mathematician of the truth of a given statement” (Devlin, 2003).
The first thing to notice here is that Devlin uses ‘argument’ to characterize both
wings: his is not an opposition between proofs and arguments, but between two
sorts of argument that a proof can be. However, where Devlin (and many others) err
is in regarding this as an either/or distinction. A faithful and exclusive adherence to
the left wing may satisfy Devlin politically, but mathematics needs both wings.
Argumentational Structure:
Mathematical Proof, Pk
Endoxa: Data accepted by mathematical
community

Inferential Structure:
Mathematical Inference, Ik
Premisses: Axioms or statements
formally derived from axioms

argument

derivation

Claim: Ik is sound: that is, an informal
counterpart of Sk should be accepted too

Conclusion: An additional formal
statement, Sk

Figure 1: The parallel structure of mathematical reasoning (Aberdein, 2013, p. 363)

Bundy defines a Hilbertian proof as “a sequence of formulae each of which is either an axiom or
follows from earlier formulae by a rule of inference” (op. cit.).
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In various places (most extensively, Aberdein, 2013) I have defended an
account of mathematical justification as parallel in structure: see Fig. 1. The
inferential structure is comprised of deductively valid derivations of formal
statements from other formal statements: Hilbertian proof, in Bundy’s terminology.
It is the existence of this structure that underpins the uniquely compelling nature of
mathematical results. However, it is not what mathematicians actually do, as most of
them freely acknowledge (Krantz, Bundy and Devlin are all mathematicians; for
even more examples, see Aberdein, 2013, pp. 361 f.). Instead they reason in a much
looser fashion, but in such a way that they are able to become convinced that the
derivations of the inferential structure exist. It is this reasoning, which I call the
argumentational structure, which comprises the content of ordinary, rigorous
mathematics.
If exceptional cases have attracted undue attention it is because many
accounts of mathematical reasoning struggle to accommodate them. The parallel
structure depicted in Fig. 1 is loose enough to encompass the exceptional cases
which Carrascal mentions—unsurveyably long proofs, diagrammatic proofs,
contested axioms—and others which she does not—computer-assisted proof,
experimental proof, probabilistic methods. However, this should not distract from
the fact that it is first and foremost an account of ordinary, rigorous mathematics.
3. THE TENSION BETWEEN
MATHEMATICAL PROCESS

MATHEMATICAL

PRODUCTS

AND

THE

In this section I wish to alleviate “the tension between the practice and the products
of this practice” that Carrascal discerns in works on mathematical argumentation
(Carrascal, 2013, p. 7). I will show that the distinction discussed in the last section is
a distinction between different types of justification and thereby between different
senses of proof-as-object, not proof-as-process. It follows that both aspects of proof
are argumentative. Then I will argue that once we appreciate that, we may
understand the two aspects as working in concert, not in tension.
The distinction between inferential and argumentational structure is a
distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, respectively (on this
distinction, see Kvanvig & Menzel, 1990, p. 235; Klein, 2007, p. 6). Propositional
justification is a relationship between an individual and a proposition which they
may or may not believe: “We can say that a proposition, h, is propositionally justified
for S just in case there is an epistemically adequate basis for h that is available to S
regardless of whether S believes that h, or whether S is aware that there is such a
basis, or whether if S believes that h, then S believes h on that basis” (Klein, 2007,
p. 6). However, it is doxastic justification that is required for knowledge. This relates
the individual to a belief state, not a proposition: “A belief that h is doxastically
justified for S when and only when S is acting in an epistemically responsible manner
in believing that h” (ibid.). In mathematics, propositional justification may be
Hilbertian in character, but doxastic justification is not. Rather, it requires ordinary
rigour, which is inherently argumentative: it is the means by which mathematicians
persuade their peers of their results.
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To consider a recent mathematical example, Yitang Zhang’s proof that there
are infinitely many pairs of primes that differ by no more than 70 million proceeds
“not via a radically new approach to the problem, but by applying existing methods
with great perseverance” (Klarreich, 2013). As one leading number theorist
observed, “The big experts in the field had already tried to make this approach work
… he succeeded where all the experts had failed” (cited in Klarreich, 2013). That is,
an epistemically adequate basis for Zhang’s result was available to those “big
experts”, so it was propositionally justified for them. However, since they could not
see how to construct the proof, it was not doxastically justified for them. Another
recent mathematical example provides a contrast: Shinichi Mochizuki’s claimed
proof of the ABC conjecture introduces so many new techniques and concepts that
other leading mathematicians in the field describe it as like “reading a paper from
the future, or from outer space” and as “very, very weird” (cited in Chen, 2013). If
Mochizuki has proved the result, it is propositionally (but presumably not
doxastically2) justified for him, but it’s not yet propositionally justified for other
mathematicians. The words “proof” and “proving” are used in lots of different ways
and the Hilbertian/rigorous distinction which I have drawn attention to is only one
of many possible distinctions. One study of mathematics education research
identifies eight different, overlapping senses (Reid & Knipping, 2010, p. 33).
Carrascal focuses on a distinction between process and product. Several
observations may be made about her use of this distinction. Firstly, this distinction
is familiar to argumentation theorists from various sources (for example, Habermas,
1984, p. 18; Pinto, 2001, p. 119). It is also familiar to philosophers of mathematical
practice, as the distinction between context of discovery and context of justification:
“the thinker’s way of finding this theorem and his way of presenting it before a
public”, as the originator of the distinction illustrated it (Reichenbach, 1938, p. 5). As
Carrascal observes, the proving process comprises the discovery of a proof by which
the result is justified (Carrascal, 2013, p. 7). However, the identification of the proof
as the “product” of the proving process begs the question as to the exact nature of
proofs. This point has been made by Geoff Goddu with respect to the corresponding
distinction in the sense of ‘argument’ (Goddu, 2011, p. 87). Rather than
distinguishing proof-as-process and proof-as-product we might rather distinguish
proof-as-process and proof-as-object.
Each of proof-as-process and proof-as-object could be subdivided further.
Indeed, they correspond to respectively five and two of Reid and Knipping’s senses
of proof (Reid & Knipping, 2010, p. 33). Crucially, the distinction discussed in the
last section, between Hilbertian and rigorous proof (or inferential and
argumentational structure, or propositional and doxastic justification) is a
subdivision of proof-as-object. Conversely, both proof-as-process and proof-asobject may be subsumed under larger headings. In the terminology of the sociologist
Erving Goffman, as appropriated by the mathematician Reuben Hersh, the former
belongs to the “back” of mathematics: “mathematics as it appears among working
Mochizuki would not be doxastically justified if, as seems plausible, “acting in an epistemically
responsible manner” includes successfully explaining the proof to others and he has not yet done
this.
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mathematicians, in informal settings, told to one another in an office behind closed
doors”; the latter to the “front” of mathematics: “mathematics in ‘finished’ form, as it
is presented to the public in classrooms, textbooks, and journals” (Hersh, 1991,
p. 128). Philosophy of mathematical practice needs to pay attention to the front and
the back, and thereby to both proof-as-process and proof-as-object, and especially to
their interaction. Mechanisms devised in argumentation theory may be crucial to
the last of these. For example, Chris Reed and Douglas Walton have argued that
argumentation schemes represent a point of contact between the two views (Reed
and Walton, 2003).
4. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have seen that argumentation theory can make a critical
contribution to three projects in the philosophy of mathematical practice: analysis
of proof-as-process, analysis of proof-as-object, and analysis of the relationship
between the two. Carrascal is correct to insist on the importance of distinguishing
the projects, and she offers many valuable insights into how the first project should
proceed, but she is wrong to suppose that argumentation theory has nothing to say
about the other two.
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